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Tariff History Lessons from the European Periphery. 
Protection Intensity and the Infant Industry Argument 
in Spain and Italy 1870-1930 
Antonio Tena Junguito ∗ 
Abstract: »Lehren der Zollgeschichte aus der europäischen Peripherie. Pro-
tektionsintensität und das ‚Infant Industry Argument’ in Spanien und Italien 
1870-1930«. This paper endeavors to study Spanish protectionism on the Ital-
ian mirror. On the assumption that the literature presents both European pe-
ripheral countries at a similar stage of development and commercial policy re-
plies to late 19th century economic globalization. Italian tariff policy was much 
more moderate and influenced by fiscal duties than the Spanish one that en-
joined a very high tariffs on the manufacture sector. This paper present by first 
time a unified data base of effective protection and revealed comparative ad-
vantage for both countries and develop a new test based on the infant industry 
argument. Conclusions emphasize the existence of significant different tariff 
policies in Spain and Italy between 1870-1930 as a relevant variable in the 
configuration their respective export manufacture competitiveness and spe-
cialization in the long run.  
Keywords: European Periphery Protection 1870-1930, Spain and Italy Tariffs, 
Infant Industry Argument, Revenue and Protective products. 
Introduction 
The late 19th century is one of the most controversial periods for economic 
historians to evaluate the consequences of economic policy over the European 
economic growth. The English free-trade climacteric along with the protection-
ist strong growth of Germany, USA an others high tariffs New Settlers has 
often been considered an evidence in support of protectionist arguments. The 
debate has so far relied mainly on anecdotal evidence on duties or tariff laws, 
or in best cases in tariffs average crude correlation with growth. Notably Bai-
roch (1976, 1989, 1996) praise protectionism as instrumental to the develop-
ment of late XIXth century Continental Europe. Recently positive correlation 
across countries found between tariffs average and growth during the years of 
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return to protection (1870-1913) by O’Rourke (2000), Clemens-Williamson 
(2001) and Vamvakidis (2002) strengthened the traditional good reputation 
between protection and growth at the end of XIX century1.  
Theoretical and empirical literature show that in the initial stages of devel-
opment, and so much so in economies with a small size of their domestic mar-
ket, protection determines, much more than in developed economies, direction 
in which resources are allocated, especially in manufactures (Krueger(1998). 
Commercial strategies, as one of the main institutional intervention on indus-
trial and market structures in the late 19th century, should be a mayor research 
priority to understand the different growth performance of the European pe-
riphery in those years.  
Economic theory offers an agreement on the static welfare losses produced 
by protection on an economy but it does not exist a complete agreement on the 
size and consequences of the dynamic effects that link protection with effi-
ciency lost in allocation of resources and export competitiveness. One group of 
economists put the emphasis in the dynamics of economies of scale, learning 
by doing and technical innovation that sectors protected may develop as a 
consequence of temporal protection. Improvements in productivity and com-
parative advantage in the future overcome present protection static welfare 
losses. Some writers – for example Myrdal (1957) – maintain that this eco-
nomic conditions apply to most manufacturing industries in less-developed 
countries, and they believe, therefore, that general protective measures are 
justified in these economies. This argument is known as the classical “infant 
industry argument” (see Baldwing (1969)). This interpretation has aroused 
skeptical reactions on the part of a second group of economist like Jhonson 
(1970), Krueger(1974)), who remember that the protection policies are more 
related with the political economy of pressure groups than with the identifica-
tion of potential export activities by governments. Protection normally encour-
ages more rent seeking than a reduction cost process as an easy way to increase 
profits. This imply the renounce of competitiveness and as a consequence re-
duce the possibilities of developing an export sector on the lines of comparative 
advantage (Balassa (1965) (1977).  
This paper endeavors to study Spanish protectionism on the Italian mirror. 
On the assumption that literature present both European peripheral countries at 
a similar stage of development and reacted with a similar protectionist reply to 
late 19th century economic globalization. Italian economy grew faster than its 
Spanish counterpart at the turn of the century Giolittian period of expansion of 
the international economy while Spanish economy performed better during the 
1920’s in a less expansive international context. It seems likely that on the 
verge of the 1930’s both countries still enjoyed a similar per-capita income. 
                                                             
1  For a critical position on the positive correlation found between tariff average and growth 
see Irwin (2002a, 2002b) and Tena (2006a).  
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Nevertheless, competitiveness and specialization of the respective industrial 
structures were quite different, as the manufacture export performance in the 
two countries shows since the turn of the century. This paper will emphasize 
the existence of significant different protection policies in Spain and Italy be-
tween 1860-1930 as main influential variable of the different industrial struc-
ture and competitiveness performance of both economies.  
In the next pages we will study comparatively the Spanish and the Italian 
structures of protection from the 1877 to 1926 following recent research by 
Prados-Tena (1994), and Federico and Tena (1998, 1999) and Tena (1999, 
2002, 2006b, 2006c) including a new unified data base evidence on Spanish 
and Italian effective protection and revealed comparative advantage for both 
countries elaborated for this. The data on prices, quantities and specific duties 
are taken from Spanish and Italian imports and exports official statistics pooled 
together in 400 to 500 items following a 4-digit SITC for five bench marks 
years along this period (1877, 1889, 1897, 1913, 1926). This study is therefore 
based upon a consistent set of comparable figures for Spain and Italy of nomi-
nal protection, effective protection and Revealed Comparative Advantage.  
The first section outlines Spanish and Italian trade policy in the context of 
European tariff history and deals with the controversy about the level and ex-
tension of protection in both countries. Section two goes further in the analysis 
of the quantitative evidence to characterize the Italian and Spanish protectionist 
as low and fiscal versus high and manufacture respectively. Fiscal products 
were already important in Italy and manufactures in Spain since the 1870’s but 
this influence seems to be accentuated with the return of protection in both 
countries in the 1890’s. Section three develop a test on the infant industry ar-
gument for Spain and Italy which aims at measuring the dynamic effects pro-
duced by protection on both economies. It explores the relation between effec-
tive protection and comparative advantage developing a simple test based on 
the correlation ranking position changes on the levels and the growth rates of 
both variables. The paper concludes that changes in comparative advantage in 
Spain along the period seems negatively connected in some way with the evo-
lution, characteristic and severity of the commercial policy while evidence 
found for Italy show a more positive connection. This conclusion, along with 
other evidence, supports the hypothesis that the Spanish slow industrial growth 
would be at least as much related with its low capacity to find some lines of 
comparative advantages inside manufacture sector than with the failure of 
domestic demand. 
1. Tariff histories, tariff averages and structure of protection 
The Spanish and Italian commercial policies histories should be read within the 
context of the turn-over of protectionism in which most Continental Europe 
participated in between the second half of the 1870 and the First World War. 
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The literature on European commercial policies situate the change of direction 
between free-trade and protection around the second half of the 1870’s and the 
consolidation in this new trend in the 1890’s. Through out the twenty years 
after unification Italy was a free trade country, while Spain entertained a 
shorter and doubtful free trade period since the second half of the 1860’s. Span-
ish trade barrier at the end of the free trade period was probably between two 
and three fold higher than the Italian one. The new tariff introduced in Spain 
for first time in July 1877 was similar to the double tariff that will be adopted 
by many other European countries in the following years as happened with 
Italy tariff law of 1878. Italy came from a real free trade protection position, 
but 1878 tariff law return to protection was even previous to the famous Ger-
man tariff of 1879, and this contribute to share a similar protectionist reputa-
tion. Nevertheless most scholars date the real beginning of protection in Italy 
with the approval of the new tariff of 1887 and in Spain with the Canovas Law 
of 1891. Italian 1887 new tariff introduced a new duty on wheat and a new 
tariff on manufactures that caused an open trade-war with France, then Italy 
main trading-partner. The 1887 tariff lasted officially more than thirty years 
with some minor interventions, ad-hoc laws, and by trade treaties. From the 
second half of the 1890’s the level of protection was decreasing as price in-
crease reduced the level of ad-valorem equivalent of the (specific) duties. The 
Spanish protectionist tariff of 1892 also provoked a tariff war with France and 
Germany. Besides, the loss of her remaining colonies (Cuba, Philippines and 
Puerto Rico) in 1898 reduced exports and induced a strong pessimism that led 
to pressures for increased protectionism which resulted in the new tariff law of 
1906. Some minor modifications were introduced in 1912 before the new tariff 
law of 1922 that spread the number of duties items and increased manufacture 
protectionism before the general contraction and desintegration of the interna-
tional economy in the 1930’s.  
A look at the yearly tariff average (NT measured as a fraction of total tariff 
revenues on import value) of Figure 1 only partially confirms this conventional 
wisdom. Protection increased in Italy since the late 1870’s but it is not until the 
late 1880’s that it reaches a similar level to Spain with a steady and linear in-
crement until the turn of the century, when the trend inverse initiating a con-
stant reduction of protection until First War World. In the 1920’s the index just 
recuperates the pre-war levels. On the contrary, Spanish level of departure in 
the 1860s is superior to the Italian one and the return to protection is earlier. 
Spanish protection seems to be maintained on steady levels from the early 
1880’s to First War World, with the exception of the clear sharp pick in the 
early 1890’s. In the 1920’s protection went through a new sudden increase and 
clearly exceeded pre-war levels in the second half of the decade. The Spanish 
index is much more cycle and presents sharp picks and contractions along the 
series in contrast with the more linear and continuous upward and downward 
trend of the Italian index. In short: the Italian index represents better the con-
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ventional European commercial history of a free trade period followed by a 
temporal protectionist one, even if it presents a similar level to Spain at least at 
the turn of the century. On the contrary, the Spanish protectionism index does 
not fit with the idea of a temporary return to protection and it appears more as a 
structural cyclical feature of the Spanish economic development from the sec-
ond half of the 1870. Nevertheless from the second half of the 1880’s decade to 
the first years of the turn of the century Italy would show superior average 
tariff levels than Spain. 
Figure 1 
Average Tariff Rates in Spain and Italy 1860-1913 
 
Sources: Tena (1999, 2006a) 
Figure 2 
Weighted Average Tariff in Spain and Italy, 1877-1926 
 
Sources: Tena (1999, 2006a).  
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Figure 3 
Unweighted Tariff Average in Spain and Italy, 1877-1926 
 
Sources: Tena (1999, 2006a).  
 
Figures 2 and 3 show the different evolution of the weighted (NT) and un-
weighted (UNT) tariff average respectively for both countries. Italian weighted 
average has a similar level and evolution than the unweighted average (UNT). 
On the contrary Spanish conventional NT weighted tariff average has a clear 
downward bias especially in the last years of the period. The first would show a 
temporal but severe return to protection and the second a steady high level 
from the 1870’s. The alternative simple average invert this perception and 
Spain years of return to protection in 1897 and 1913 would shows significant 
higher levels than Italy, and further more the Spanish steady protectionist evo-
lution would revert in a clearer cyclical upward trend2. 
Table 2 allows for a first approximation on the different extension and struc-
ture of protection in Spain and Italy. Tariffs were more concentrated in Spain 
than in Italy s showed by the differences in the Italian and Spanish coefficients 
of variations in 1877, 1889 and 1897. Some In general the Italian coefficients 
double the Spanish ones but causes of this bigger concentration of the Italian 
tariff in few products may be produced by different causes along the period. In 
1877 the Spanish protection level was rather higher than the Italian one, mainly 
because only a 20 per cent of the Italian imports was significantly protected 
(>10%) when the Spanish imports with the same protection represented almost 
                                                             
2  The Board of Trade (1905) offer a result of 76 percent for Spain and 27 percent for Italy as 
f manufacture tariff average in 1902. This interesting comparative study for the manufac-
ture protection use the composition of British manufacture exports for every country in 
1902 as an uniform standard weigh. For other international studies comparing tariff average 
in this period see Federico Tena (1998) Table A.4 and Table A.5 p.96-97. 
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a 50%. Furthermore, Italian high-protected imports (>30%) were only 2 percent 
of total imports (against a 16 per cent in Spain) and concentrated in only 4 
products with protection over 50 percent. Furthermore Italian dispersion coeffi-
cients are high because the codes distribution free trade and high taxed fiscal 
products are bigger than in Spain.  
Table 2: The structure of protection in Spain and Italy  
(Percentage of imports into different segments of nominal tariffs) 
 1877 1889 1897 1913 1926 
Coefficient. Variation SPAIN 1,01 0,87 0,81 0,97 0,81 
Coeff. Variation ITALY 2,5 2,1 1,9 1,3 1,2 
 
Tariffs > 10% SPAIN 46% 38% 48% 42% 46% 
                        ITALY 21% 44% 31% 30% 47% 
Tariffs > 20% SPAIN 27% 27% 24% 24% 29% 
                        ITALY 12% 30% 20% 20% 26% 
Tariffs > 30% SPAIN 16% 5% 15% 17% 16% 
                        ITALY 2% 7% 14% 3% 7% 
Tariffs > 50% SPAIN 4% 1% 2% 5% 4% 
                        ITALY 2% 6% 5% 2% 5% 
Number of goods >50% SPAIN 6 7 42 22 51 
Number of goods >50% ITALY 4 12 11 13 20 
Sources: Data base Spain and Italy (see text). 
 
Another interesting exercise is to compare differences and similarities in tar-
iff structures after the respective 1887 and 1891 tariff laws of return to protec-
tion. In both cases more than the half of imports got a protection higher than 10 
per cent, even if Italy maintains a higher percentage of low protected products. 
Most of imports in both cases are situated in a tariff interval between 10-50 
percent but the Italians are closer to the 20-30-segment percentage and the 
Spanish to the 30-50-percentage interval. A few products in Italy had protec-
tion over 50 percent but they concentrated a high share over total imports. On 
the contrary, Spain in 1897 had a higher number of products with protection 
over 50 per cent but with a share in total imports three times lower than in 
Italy. Generally speaking, the interpretation of this figures (as we shall prove 
forwards) is that Italian 1889 new tariff was moderate in most of the products 
imported. Only a reduced number of goods with an important share in import 
value and low price import elasticity increased protection in 1889 which ex-
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plain both high tariff average and high coefficient of dispersion. On the con-
trary, the 1897 Spanish return of protection was more extensive, tariffs increase 
affected a higher number of products with lower coefficient of dispersion, 
which means that tariffs spread on the most significant sectors of the economy. 
After the turn of the century the aggregate level of protection in Italy goes 
down steadily until 1913 while Spain keep the aggregate average at a similar 
degree than in 1897. As Table 2 shows Italian moderation is possible because 
of the extension of imports with duties below 10 percent in combination with 
the additional reduction of the share of imports with duties over 30% and the 
reduction share of the few fiscal products taxed over 50 per cent. The Spanish 
general structure of protection in 1913 appears similar to that of 1897, but tariff 
dispersion increases because of the light increment of both tails in the protec-
tion distribution. Products with very low duties and with very high duties in-
crease their share in the total imports following the Italian path. The Spanish 
average of protection in 1926 is much higher than the Italian one, but both 
distributions shapes became closer because of a proportional reduction shares 
of the lowest and highest taxed products in total imports. That means that the 
central body structure of both distributions appear much similar than in previ-
ous periods, even if Italy maintain its imports closer to the (20%-30%) and 
Spain to the (30%-50%) tariffs intervals.  
Next section will try to prove that manufactures lead tariff increases in 
Spain during the 1890 decade of return to protection. Inside manufactures, 
consumer goods and its main component the cotton textiles, got the best protec-
tive position, even if steel industry was protected too (see Tena (1999, 2006a). 
On the contrary, Fiscal products headed the protection reaction in Italy, with a 
moderate industrial reaction leaded by steel heavy industry and some chemicals 
products (see Federico-Tena (1998)).  
2. Two Paths: Moderate and Fiscal versus High and 
Industrial tariffs 
Custom revenues accounted for a sizeable share of total fiscal revenues in 
Europe and this share increased quite fast after the return to protection from 
1880 to 1913 (see Bairoch (1989)). Spanish custom revenue share increase 
faster than in Italy or France (Germany differences in Central State definitions 
make this share no comparable) but custom revenues in real terms growth was 
definitively slower than in the other three mayor Western European Continental 
Countries. In Italy and Spain until the late 1870’s custom revenues accounted 
around 7 percent of total government revenue. In the next decade, this share 
would double in Italy while in Spain it only increased one third. The Spanish 
ratio increased faster in the 1890’s than the Italian one but mainly because of a 
slower growth of the Spanish total government revenues during these years. As 
prove the costume revenue growth in real absolute terms between the 1870-
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1880 and the 1890-1900’s decades that in Italy threefold while in Spain only 
doubled. Actually, around the half of total costume revenue in this three dec-
ades in Italy were yield by three products only: sugar, coffee and oil, and in 
Spain three main revenue products (cod, coffee and oil) yield around 1/5 of 
total (the share of total “colonials” did not arrive to 1/4).  
Table 3: Concentration of Tariff Revenues in Spain and Italy 1877-1926 
  Three imports goods with higher tariff revenue 
(Percentage over total tariff revenue) 
 
SITC  (1)   +  SITC (2)   +   SITC (3)   =  TOTAL 
Number of 
products 
Summing more 
than 80%  total 
of total tariff 
revenue 
Spain 1877 0610(11,7%) + 0350( 9,0%) + 6543( 7,6%) = (28,3%) 47 
Italy 1877 0610(25,7%) + 3330(16,3%) + 0711(10,3%) = (52,3%) 9 
Spain 1889 3330( 8,6%) + 0410( 7,5%) + 1124 (7,0 %) = (23,1%) 57 
Italy 1889 0610(34,7%) + 0410(25,2%) + 3330(19,4%) = (79,3%) 4 
Spain 1897 0411(14,6%) + 3330(10,5%) + 0459( 7,7%) = (32,8%) 58 
Italy 1897 0610(32,8%) + 3330(16,3%) + 0410(15,3%) = (64,4%) 8 
Spain 1913 0711(13,3%) + 0411( 8,4%) + 0350( 7,8%) = (29,5%) 61 
Italy 1913 0410(33,0%) + 0711(10,6%) + 3330( 5,2%) = (48,8%) 38 
Spain 1926 0711(12,0%) + 3330( 8,2%) + 0350( 6,6%) = (26,8%) 89 
Italy 1926 0410(25,7%) + 0711 (9,3%) + 3341 (8,6%) = (43,6%) 37 
Codes number SITC (Standard International Trade Classification): 0350 code; 0410 wheat; 
0459 other cereals; 0610 sugar; 0711 Coffee (no roasted); 1124 liquors-alcohol’s; 3330 petro-
leum and oils; 3341 gasoline and refined oils; 6543 wool textiles. Sources: the same than table 
2. 
 
Table 3 offers some relevant information about the different protection 
structure contrasting the tariff revenue concentration of both countries along 
the analyzed period. Return to protection in both countries coincides with the 
higher level of tariff revenue concentration in the three main products in the 
respective years of 1889 and 1897 in both countries, even if differences in 
concentration are remarkable. Three main tariff revenue products in 1889 Italy 
concentrated around 80 per cent of total revenue, while in 1897 Spain they 
would constitute less than 30 per cent. This difference was already present in 
1877, but fiscal products leads was determinant to explain return to protection 
in Italy in 1889. Revenue tariffs were very present also in 1897 but with a 
 349
concentration similar to 1877. In the next years before First War World still 
around thirty products were responsibly of most of tariff revenue. In the Italian 
case is remarkable the correlation between the ups and downs in revenue con-
centration and the ups and downs in the level of average tariff. Three main 
revenue products appear as an important explicative variable of the general 
trend in total protection average. On the contrary, main revenue products con-
centration in Spain is much less important and regular along the period and in 
consequence with no significant influence on the level and trend of average 
tariff index.  
Figure 4 
Average Tariffs Rates Without Main Fiscal Produsts in Spain and Italy,  
1860-1913 
 
Sources: Spanish and Italian Official Foreign Trade Statistics yearly. Spain total custom and 
imports with out: code, coffee and oil. Italy total custom and imports without sugar, coffee and 
oil.  
 
Figure 4 shows quite clearly the relevance of fiscal products in Italy. With-
out its three main revenue products, the perception of Italian levels and changes 
in protection are quite different from that showed in Figure 1. Italian free-trade 
period can be clearly extended from the early 1860’s to the implementation of 
the 1887 tariff law (with no years above 6 per-cent). Italian fiscal duties rele-
vance is noticeable from the end of the 1870’s and it influences the significant 
custom revenues growth of the following years without affecting imports sub-
stantially. Protection backlash is clear but much less impressive than in Figure 
1, with the highest picks around a 10 per-cent in the second half of the 1890’s. 
Fiscal protection accounted for about three quarters of the rise in total protec-
tion from 1877 to 1897 (Federico and Tena 1998, Table1). The contrast be-
tween Figures 1 and 4 offers a radical change in the perception of the Italian 
protection. That’s support the proposition that one can not understand the Ital-
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ian commercial policy history without taking into account the fiscal side of the 
issue. In Spain main fiscal duties were imposed after the 1898 Cuba’s war, 
following the fiscal reform of Fernandez Villaverde in 1899, when duties of the 
so-called “Colonials” increase notably. Nevertheless, as figure 4 show, main 
tariff revenues would not alter significantly the trend and the level of the Span-
ish Average tariff level, because of its lower share in total imports showed in 
Table 3. 
Table 4: Mayor components of the “Return to Protection” Spain (1891) and 
Italy (1887)*  
 Primary 
Products 
Wheat Sugar Sugar 
Petrol 
Coffee 
Semi-
manu-
factures 
Iron 
Steel 
Manufac-
tures 
Textiles 
1877-1897 
SPAIN 
34% 23% -14% 7% 11% 16% 55% 45% 
1877-1889 
ITALY 
62% 9% 23% 53% 17% 7% 21% 13% 
*Sectoral protection as NT, UNT and RNT simple average (see Tena (1999, 2006a). 
Sources: data base Spain (seer text), Italy: Federico Tena (1998). Italy 1877-1889 simple 
average of NT and UNT because technical absence of RNT in the 1877 year.  
 
Table 4 measures the contribution of a significant group of products and 
sectors from the 1870’s to the total increment of protection after the respective 
“return to protection” in Spain and Italy. The contribution of 34% of the Span-
ish primary product sector to the total increment of protection between 1877 to 
1897 is computed as the difference between the real increment between both 
years of total average and the contrafactual of keeping tariffs and value of 
imports of the sector in 1897 at the same level than in 1877. The mayor com-
ponents of the “return of protection” in Italy came from the Primary Products 
tariff increments and especially from the small group of products with clear 
fiscal intentions. Italian sugar, petroleum and coffee are responsible for more 
than half of the total protection increment between these two years. On the 
other side, the Spanish manufacture tariffs would be the main responsible of 
the Spanish backlash to globalization between 1877 and 1897. Textile goods 
contribution to protection between these two years was outstanding, represent-
ing alone around half of the total tariff increment, followed with less than a 
quarter by Wheat.  
Spain and Italy, as many others countries in Continental Europe had their re-
turn to protection at the end of 1880s but evidence showed that the extension, 
the level and the responsibility of the different sectors appear quite diverse. 
First, because from the free trade period the Spanish level of protection at least 
doubles the Italian and manufactures for the first and and primary products 
were the main components of the tariff structures in the respective countries. 
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Second, manufacture tariff increase was the main responsible of the Spanish 
return of protection in 1891, meanwhile, Italian return to protection in 1887 
was strongly influenced by a few numbers of products (sugar, coffee and petro-
leum). These primary products had an especial low import price elasticity that 
means that when tariff increase imports do not suffer a relevant contraction and 
in consequence are normally used for fiscal reasons. In the absence of those 
products tariff average level is reduced to half in practice. Third, after the re-
spective main tariffs laws of 1891 and 1887 Spain shows a cyclical protection-
ist upward trend meanwhile Italy a cyclical downward until the interwar years 
(see figure 3). In other words, fiscal products were already important in Italy 
and manufactures in Spain from the 1870’s but this influence seems to be ac-
centuated by the respective main tariff laws of 1887 and 1891 in both countries. 
In short evidence analyzed above suggest that Italy and Spain followed two 
different paths of protection from 1870 to 19303. 
3. Protection and competitiveness: a test to the Infant 
Industry Argument 
This section will explore the relation between effective protection and com-
parative advantage in Spain and Italy taking into account the evidence and 
discussion of previous sections. The aim is to offer some evidence on the eco-
nomic dynamic consequences of the different industrial tariff policy followed 
by both countries during the years of return to protection. The test, will follow 
the classical work of Krueger and Tuncer (1982) and the Harrison (1994) 
comment. It consists in passing the condition of having been protected on in-
fant industry grounds. The necessary (but not sufficient) condition is that cost 
in (temporarily) protected industries should have decrease over time more 
quickly than cost in non-protected or less-protected industries. In this work that 
means that Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) in protected sectors 
should have increased over time more quickly than Revealed Comparative 
Advantage (RCA) in less protected sectors. A positive answer to the test in 
which sectors with an increment in the ranking of growth protected sectors 
experiment also an improvement in the ranking of growth revealed comparative 
advantage (as a proxy of higher productivity growth), is only a necessary but 
not sufficient condition of the economic nature of protection. Productivity 
growth should overcome the accumulated protection welfare losses. On the 
contrary a negative answer is a sufficient condition for the uneconomic nature 
of protection and allows us to reject the hypothesis that protection was based 
on the grounds of the infant industry argument. Effective Protection (EFP) and 
                                                             
3  On the importance of different elasticity of demand between fiscal and manufacture prod-
ucts and their impact on welfare see O’Rourke (1997).  
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Revealed Comparative Advantage(RCA) coefficients were estimated by three 
digits SITC of the industrial sector for our usual benchmark years 1877, 1889, 
1897, 1913 and 1926 in Italy and Spain using similar methods (see Federico-
Tena (1999) and Tena (2006c). The disaggregated results and the estimated 
method of the two main variables are shown in Appendix A. Should be noticed 
here only that the RCA coefficient used in this work RCA= [(Xi-Mi)/(Xi+Mi)]-
[Σ(Xi-Mi)/Σ(Xi+Mi)] is a differential coefficient between the relative individ-
ual sector net export with the total net export of that year. This coefficient 
allow in case of competitive devaluation (leaving out the fact that different 
sector elasticity of demand imply different sector export reply) to reduce the 
influence of exchange rate distortions on net export sector relative position that 
were important in Spain during the turn of the century. Also in the Appendix is 
discussed the influence of lost Cuba, Filipinas y Puerto Rico, on relative net 
export along the time. 
Table 5: Spearman Correlation Coefficients between Industrial Effective 
Protection Levels and Revealed Comparative Advantage Growth in the Spanish 
Industry 1877-1926  
 RCA77-89 RCA89-97 RCA97-13 RCA13-26 
EFP.77 - 0.15 (74) +0.003 (74) - 0.172* (75) - 0.178 * (76) 
EFP.89 - 0.061 (73) - 0.040 (77) - 0.199* (76) - 0.164 (76) 
EFP.97  - 0.084 (80) - 0.157 (83) - 0.315 & (81) 
EFP.13   - 0.257 # (94) - 0.238 # (114) 
EFP.26    - 0.007 (117) 
Notes: The number of observations is given in parentheses below each correlation coefficient. 
Effective Protection and Revealed Comparative Advantage for the j sector EFPj= (tj-Σ (aij*ti)/ 
(1-Σaij^)), RCAj= [(Xj-Mj)/(Xj+Mj)]-[Σ(Xj-Mj)/Σ(Xj+Mj)], respectively. The RCA Growth 
measure is (RCAn –RCAn-1)/RCAn-1. Industrial Sectors are defined at SITC three digit level 
(only four digit for the textile sector). * Significant at 5%. # Significant at 1%. & Significant 
at 0.5%. 
 
Table 5 shows the Spearman matrix correlation coefficients between the 
level in industrial effective protection by sector (EFP) in one year and their 
respective growth in Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) in following 
years. We use correlative benchmark years in which we have data on both 
variables (that go between the 117 to 73 sectors in the case of Spain and 41 to 
81 for Italy). For instance, the coefficient -0.15 that cross EFP.77 and RCA77-
89 shows the ranking correlation coefficient between the industrial sector level 
of effective protection for 74 sectors ordered in three digits SITC for the year 
1877 and the ranking in the growth of revealed comparative advantage of the 
same sectors between 1877 and 1889. Protection ranking level correlates the 
ranking of improvement in performance.  
If protection induces improvements in productivity the more protected sec-
tors revealed comparative advantage should growth more quickly than the 
 353
others, so the Spearman ranking correlation coefficient should be positive. If 
the correlation coefficient is negative would be because the RCA, of the more 
protected sectors, increase slower than the others. Because of the expected 
temporal dynamic effect of infant protection, we will pay a special attention to 
correlation from one ranking of comparative advantage growth to previous 
period increment in the ranking of effective protection growth. A positive cor-
relation coefficient will allow us to set up a necessary condition to judge if 
there were some dynamic factors in the future that may have warranted inter-
vention in the past. For Spain, Table 5 shows every correlation with a negative 
sign (with the exception of a very low positive coefficient between EFP1877 
and RCA89-97). The periods with clearer negative sign are first, the coefficient 
that correlate the level of protection in 1897 with growth in RCA between 1913 
and 1926 (-0.238 and significant at 0.5%) and second the respective for the 
years EFP1913-RCA1897-1913 and EFP1913-RCA1913-26 (both significant 
at 1%). On these grounds it is reasonable to argue that in the Spanish case there 
is a clearer evidence of perverse consequences of protection for competitive-
ness in the long run than in the other way around. Following Krueger-Tuncer 
model, Spanish trade regime provided not only welfare losses for the economy 
in the period implemented but also long run competitiveness losses in main 
sectors protected. Protection did not allow at all the sort of growth in compara-
tive advantage on which infant industry proponents base their claims for pro-
tection4.  
Table 6: Spearman Correlation Coefficients between Industrial Effective 
Protection Growth and Revealed Comparative Advantage Growth in Spain 
1877-1926 (Industry) 
 RCA77-89 RCA89-97 RCA97-13 RCA13-26 
EFP.77-89 - 0.027 (72) +0.082 (72) - 0.037 (73) +0.028 (74) 
EFP.89-97  - 0.108 (77) - 0.276 &(76) - 0.425 &(76) 
EFP.97-13   +0.064 (83) +0.130 (81) 
EFP.13-26    +0.203 * (114) 
Notes: The number of observations is given in parentheses below each correlation coefficient. 
Variables:EFP (tn-1 – tn) and RCA (tn-1 – tn) growth measure as (EFPn –EFPn-1)/EFPn-1 
and (RCAn –RCAn-1)/RCAn-1 respectively. Sectors defined at SITC three digits level. For 
estimation and disaggregated tables of the Effective protection and Revealed Comparative 
Advantage sectors see Appendix. RCA= [(Xi-Mi)/(Xi+Mi)]-[Σ(Xi-Mi)/Σ(Xi+Mi)]. * Signifi-
cant at 5%; # Significant at 1%; & Significant at 0.5%. 
 
                                                             
4  A similar result is obtained in a Pardos (1998) recent work that use a General equilibrium 
model on the incidence of protection during the period 1870-1913 in Spain. This work 
show that the Spanish export sector absorbed the 80% of the total cost of protection and that 
this cost was growing along the time (p.92). 
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Table 6 shows correlation between effective protection and the RCA sectors 
growth in Spain. This extension of table 5 model pretend to capture the connec-
tion between increments in protection and faster improvement in competitive-
ness in the future. In this case the most relevant result is the significant nega-
tive, high and growing correlation coefficients between the years of 
establishment of the Spanish main tariff protection law 1891 (EFP.89-97) and 
the consecutive periods of growth of comparative advantage RCA97-13 and 
RCA13-26 with significant growing correlation coefficients of (-0.28) and (-
0.42) respectively. This result suggest that in the period with higher industrial 
duties increase, the manufacture activities with higher protection increase were 
those that experienced the lesser growth in comparative advantage in the future, 
and that this negative correlation was reinforced along the time. On the con-
trary, positive but not significant signs are founded between the period 
EFP1897-1913 (when manufactures duties average were declining swiftly, see 
table1) an RCA13-26 and positive and significant between EFP13-26 and 
RCA13-26 that would suggest a change in the design of manufacture protection 
of the 1922 tariff law.  
Table 7: Spearman Correlation Coefficients between Industrial Effective 
Protection and Industrial Revealed Comparative Advantage Growth in Italy 
1877-1926 
 RCA77-89 RCA89-97 RCA97-13 
EFP.77 +0.050 (40) +0.121 (44) +0.327 &(53) 
EFP.89 - 0.0482 (47) +0.055 (58) +0.333 &(67) 
EFP.97  +0.1154(61) +0.210 * (86) 
EFP.13   +0.227 * (91) 
Notes: The number of observations is given in parentheses below each correlation coefficient. 
Variables:EFP (tn-1 – tn) and RCA (tn-1 – tn) growth measure as (EFPn –EFPn-1)/EFPn-1 
and (RCAn –RCAn-1)/RCAn-1 respectively. Sectors defined at SITC three digit level. & 
Significant at 0.5%. * Significant at 5%. 
 
In table 7, on the contrary, Italian industrial effective protection ranking lev-
els shows positive coefficients with RCA growth for every period correlated 
except one. The first significant coefficient(at 0.5%) is found between 
EFP1877 and 1897-1913 RCA growth, what means that levels of protection by 
sector in the free trade period of 1877 has an increasing correlation with the 
consecutive periods in the same sectors Revealed Comparative Advantage 
growth. A significant coefficient is offered too between the year of return of 
protection 1889 and the Revealed Comparative Advantage growth during 
1897-1913 years. This suggest that the accumulated effect of protection on 
industrial activities was not very different from 1877 than from 1889 and both 
had a significant impact on the respective sector export competitiveness before 
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First War World. The lower level of manufacture nominal and effective protec-
tion in Spain and Italy has been discussed below and in previous studies5. 
For the period 1926, we do not have RCA data for Italy, so we do not have 
evidence of positive and significant coefficients between protection levels and 
Revealed Comparative Advantage for the interwar years. It should be remem-
bered that Krueger and Tuncer (1982) and the Harrison (1994) comment model 
imply that a high positive correlation is only a necessary, but not sufficient 
condition, to support the thesis that protection was based on Infant Industry 
grounds. We need that more protected sectors growth in competitiveness much 
swifter and more persistent than less protected sectors to repay the years of 
welfare losses in the past(6). Anyway, the sufficient but not necessary condition 
to be protected on infant industrial grounds seems to fit better in the Italian 
moderate commercial industrial policy than in the higher tariff industrial policy 
country. The increment of the correlation coefficient in the consecutive periods 
between protection and RCA growth would offer some additional evidence in 
favor of robustness in the persistence of competitiveness growth in those sec-
tors in the long run. 
Table 8: Spearman Correlation Coefficients between Industrial Effective 
Protection and Industrial Revealed Comparative Advantage Growth in Italy 
1877-1926 
 RCA77-89 RCA89-97 RCA97-13 
EFP.77-89 -0.104 (41) +0.101 (45) +0.186 *(53) 
EFP.89-97  +0.071 (52) +0.187 *(67) 
EFP.97-13   +0.028 (83) 
Notes: The number of observations is given in parentheses below each correlation coefficient. 
Variables:EFP (tn-1 – tn) and RCA (tn-1 – tn) growth measure as (EFPn –EFPn-1)/EFPn-1 
and (RCAn –RCAn-1)/RCAn-1 respectively. Sectors defined at SITC three digit level. For 
estimation and disagregated tables of the Effective protection and Revealed Comparative 
Advantage sectors see Apendix. Significant at 10%. * Significant at 5%. 
 
Table 8 supports previous conclusions for Italy. Effective protection Growth 
in EFP1877-89 or EFP1889-97 have positive but no significant sign with Re-
vealed Comparative Growth in the period RCA1897-13. In the period 1889-
1897 manufactures tariff duties were declining already (see Table 1). So the 
most interesting period is related with the consequences of the industrial 
growth tariffs during the years of the return of protection, that in the case of 
Italy is related with the period PEF77-89. Nevertheless the correlation differ-
ences with Spanish table is remarkable: the sign is positive, lower and less 
significant.  
                                                             
5  See Tena (2002) and Federico&Tena (1999). 
6  See Krueger-Tuncer (1994), p.1096. 
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4. Independence Colonies, Gold Standard and Export 
Relative Competitiveness 
The Independence of the last Spanish colonies Cuba, Puerto Rico and Philip-
pines in 1898 and the separation of the Spanish coin from the Gold Standard 
from 1883 may affect our results on the Spanish export performance during the 
years of the turn of the century. The peseta external value remained stable 
between 1883 and 1895, despite of the suspended convertibility of paper 
money into gold and/or silver from 1883. From 1895 (the beginning of the 
Cuban War and the Baring Crisis) and until 1905, a combination of fiscal dis-
order and monetary expansion to finance the colonial war produced round a 30 
per cent of depreciation in the Spanish peseta value7. The peseta depreciation 
influence an increasing differential of inflation between Spain and its main 
trading partners that did not compensate the devaluation of the Spanish peseta8. 
This depreciation of the peseta fits with a positive real exports growth in Spain 
between 1890-94 and 1908-12 even if it was slower than the international mar-
ket demand9. In the same way that the in 1920’s the peseta appreciation fits 
with a negative Spanish real export growth. This do not seem to affect seriously 
relative competitive sector position that would imply that the industrial sectors 
more affected by protection in 1897 had a lower price export elasticity in 1913 
and a bigger one in 1926 than the less protected industrial sectors in the same 
year.  
The lost of Cuba did not have an important direct effect on the Spanish 
economy but produced a non negligible effect on the Spanish macroeconomic 
instability (Inflation and public deficit) and in consequence in exchange rate 
instability and isolation from foreign flows inwards in the Spanish economy10. 
A recent study on real export searching for unusual years (outliers) or abnormal 
periods (structural breaks) using time series methods, show how the largest 
impact of the year 1898 and after, occurred in the cyclical component, but does 
not imply any structural change in the parameters of this component11.  
                                                             
7  Recent provisional estimation for The Spanish Foreign Sector Current Account by Prados 
de la Escosura (2000), support the idea that the peseta depreciation in this years was caused 
more for macroeconomic inestability than for a negative Current Account Balance. This 
idea can be found also in Martin Aceña (1993) p. 140-141.  
8  See Prados-Tena (1994) and Martin Aceña (1993) support this argument. On the contrary, 
Sabate (1993, 1996) Agustín Llona (2001) suggest that the inflation differential was can-
celed by the depreciation effect.  
9  See Tena (1992) Constant market share analysis of Spain and Italy exports in Table 11.5, 
Table 11.6, pp 344and 347. 
10  See Martin Aceña (1993) y Cubel (2001). 
11  The Fraile-Escribano (1998) time series econometric analysis from 1850 to 1914 on seven 
main economic agregate variable (including, real exports, real gross domestic product per 
capita, reserve variation, manufacturing of food, manufacturing index of textile products, 
bank deposits and current account balances) only bank deposit and current account balance 
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In 1898 the independence war produced a drastic short-run reduction of ex-
ports to Cuba protected market, but total Spanish exports were not structural 
altered. Cuba absorbed almost the ninety percent of all Spanish sales to the 
colonies but colonial share in total exports was only over 23 percent of total 
Spanish exports during the 1890 decade. In the two decades preceding inde-
pendence, exports of flour and cotton textiles accounted for almost a third of 
the total volume of export to Cuba12.  
The colonies war produced a cotton textile export boom between the years 
1893-1897 (corresponding to Cuba a 45%, Philippines a 33% and Puerto Rico 
17%), but after 1898, textiles exports turned to levels similar to the pre-export 
boom because Europe and other Latin American markets attract, in part, the 
exports lost of the captive colonies market13. In this sense Pedro Fraile’s argu-
ment that main “Colonial independence adverse effects, were not due to the 
loss of colonial market, but rather to the institutional changes the colonial mar-
ket independence brought about in Spain” (p.278). Colonial independence did 
not leave Spanish industry and trade unaffected but mayor impact was on rein-
forcing, the already present, nationalist inward looking strategic, in manufac-
ture industry14.  
Last reflections connecting protection and competitiveness 
International literature acknowledges Italy and Spain as two Mediterranean 
European Continental countries with similar factor endowments, which began 
and ended this period as Peripheral Countries with similar living standards. The 
last relative GDP per head series would confirm this living standards stylized 
facts (Prados (2003)). But growth cycles between the beginning and the end of 
the period were different. Italy performance better during the 1860¨s and Spain 
during the 1870’s, the eighties growth was probably more parallel, and again 
Italian economy grew faster during the turn of the century. Spanish economy 
would performed slightly better only during the 1920’s in a less expansive 
international context. Probably before the 1930’s both countries still enjoyed a 
similar per-capita income but competitiveness and specialization of the respec-
                                                                                                                                
seem affected, statistically talking, during the years 1898 and 1899 (See Table 2, pp.273-
74). 
12  See Maluquer (1974), pp.340-341.  
13  See Sudria (1983) Table 1 and 2, pp.383-85. The share of cotton textiles exports on produc-
tion was 4.5 per cent in the 1880’s 16.8 percent in the 1890-97, 8.8 between 1898-1904 and 
around 10 percent between 1905-1913 (data show in Sudria(1983) Table 3, p.386). 
14  See Fraile-Escribano (1998), “The disaster contributed to enhance the sense of both eco-
nomic failure and urgency of reform, and this gave way to ideas of a necessary nostrifica-
tion of the Spanish economy as a remedy for backwardness” p. 281.  
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tive industrial structure were for sure quite different as manufacture export 
performance show for both countries from the turn of the century15.  
This work shows how Spanish high tariffs years, measured by the conven-
tional tariff average, appear significantly downward-biased in relation with 
other alternative index. On the contrary, the same test for the Italian return of 
protection years does not offer significant downward bias16. The high and in-
creasing share of fiscal tariffs in the Italian average during the same years have 
upward-bias the perception of a stronger return to protection. Both effects are 
well known but there were no empirical studies that had measured the rele-
vance of this fact in protection comparative studies like it is showed in this 
study. 
Previous sections have reasonably proved that Spanish tariff protection was 
high and biased to manufactures already in the second half of the 1870’s. Pro-
tection had and upward cyclical trend leaded by manufactures specially after 
the 1890’s and during the interwar years. This protectionist model seems to 
have influence negatively the long trend manufacture competitiveness. A new 
test connecting effective protection and Reveled Comparative Advantage, 
based on the infant industry argument grounds in Spain and Italy, reasonably 
proves that the consequence of protection on competitiveness is found nega-
tive, more robust and consistent in the economy that experiences a higher 
manufacture tariff increase during the period of return to protection. Industrial 
Protection appears relevant for the Spanish economic history. In the case of 
Italy, the test is not conclusive but it supports more the interpretation that in-
dustrial protection have no a clear negative influence on Italian industrial com-
petitiveness at a whole. Divergent signs and robustness between protection and 
competitiveness in Spain and Italy support the misunderstanding that both 
countries had two different paths of protection in the years of “return of protec-
tion” with long run different impact in their respective industrial sectors17. 
The most common interpretation of the backwardness of the Spanish indus-
trialization is based on the agricultural low productivity and the scarcity of the 
domestic demand for industrial products Nadal (1975). Nevertheless other 
Peripheral European Countries as Hungary, Sweden or Italy with similar in-
                                                             
15  The Spanish manufacture share on total exports arrived to 15,2 per cent in 1897 but was 
reduced to 10,3 y 7,3 per cent in 1913 and 1926 respectively, contrary to the positive trend 
showed by the Italian manufacture export sector See Tena (2005) p. 584.  
16  Tena (1999, 2006a) and Federico and Tena (1998) accounting method that discommend the 
change in nominal protection in their main components (tariffs, prices and quantities), sup-
port the existence of this bias showing how import quantities, in the Spanish case, move out 
significantly from most elastic groups of products (mainly manufactures) in main high tariff 
s increase years. The loss of weight of these products in the general index confirm the 
downward-bias of the conventional nominal protection index average. 
17  For a different point of view on the exogenous variable that determines commercial policies 
see O’Rourke (1997.b), that explain different agricultural trade policies mainly as an ad-hoc 
answer to the different impact of cheap grain in some European economies. 
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come per head demand enjoyed bigger levels of Industrial value added per head 
than Spain (Prados(1988); Fraile(1991)). Manufacture exports as proportion of 
national income were much lower in the case of Spain than in other countries 
with the same level of domestic demand (see Molinas-Prados (1989), Prados 
(1993), Tena (1992), Tena (2003). The most significant singularity of the Span-
ish industrial process seems at least so related with it low capacity to export 
manufactures to the international market than with the failure of domestic 
demand18. This finding do not reject that other variables as differences in geo-
graphical, capital and human-capital factor endowment levels of departure 
(Tortella(1994)) are involved also as explicative variables in this history. What 
can be stated is that relevant changes in the industrial comparative advantage 
along the period in Spain and Italy are connected with the different evolution, 
characteristic and severity of the commercial policy in both countries19. 
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